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Abstract: This paper aims to examine the relationship between the quality of an 
institutional environment and the characteristics of entrepreneurial activities within 
the context of China. An event study was conducted to investigate the impacts of the 
announcement of the Forbes China Rich List on prices of the shares associated with 
entrepreneurs on the list. This paper concludes that the quality of an institutional 
environment is greatly negatively related to unproductive entrepreneurial activities. 
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1. Introduction 
Although China is the second largest economy in the world, owing to the regulatory 
concerns, it ranks 84 out of 189 countries with regards to institutional environment in 
the 2015 East of Doing Business Index published by the World Bank. Besides sub-
standard institutional arrangements, private entrepreneurs in China face serious 
market access barriers due to excess state intervention (Yang, 1998). Thus, 
cooperation with local governments, or local cadres, is one of the main solutions to 
improve market access (Xin and Pearce, 1996; Bai et. al., 2014). As a result, 
productive entrepreneurial activities (e.g., innovations in technology, management, 
products, and market development) cannot be clearly distinguished from their 
unproductive counterparts (e.g., organized crime or rent-seeking behaviors), and that 
they may be carried out concurrently by a given company. The crime rate of listees of 
the Forbes China Rich List from 1999 to 2002 was 15 convictions (Table 1) out of 
213 listees, over 19 times higher than that of nation-wide.3 .   
 
Insert Table 1 Here   
 
Could formal institutions reduce unproductive entrepreneurial activities? 
North (1990) found that institutional environments influence individual behavior. 
Baumol (1990) argued that policies and norms could affect choices between 
productive and unproductive activities. When an institutional environment improves, 
entrepreneurs choose productive activities over unproductive ones because the latter 
incur higher economic and moral costs (Fadahunsi and Rosa, 2002). In view of this, 
productive and unproductive activities are considered to be in competitive supply 
(Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1991; Lu, 1994).  
However, there is endogeneity between institutional environments and 
entrepreneurial behavior. Institutional environments affect an entrepreneur’s decisions, 
                                                 
3 The overall crime rate increased from 90.54 cases per 100,000 people in 1981, to 370.36 cases per 
100,000 people in 2008.  Data about the number of crime cases comes from LAW YEARBOOK OF 
CHINA, published by the Publishing House of Law, Beijing, from 1982 to 2009. The number of 
population comes from CHINA COMPENDIUM OF STATISTICS 1949-2009.     
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but this relationship may be subjected to reverse causality. For example, informal 
institutions (e.g., family clans) are able to influence local governance (Xu and Yao, 
2015). It has therefore been historically difficult to empirically identify the causal 
relationship between institutional environments and the choice and then between the 
two types of entrepreneurial activities.  
 
This paper examines the relationship between institutional factors and 
entrepreneurial decisions regarding the tendency towards engagement in the 
productive activities in the context of China. In this study, socio-cultural environment 
refers to the social desirability of and cultural belief towards entrepreneurship. There 
is a change of socio-cultural environment towards honorees after the launch of Forbes 
China Rich List in 1999. Some tycoons on the list are suspected to seek wealth 
through improper attempts. Furthermore, companies directly and indirectly affiliated 
with the honorees who are under investigation have also faced stricter scrutiny on 
operations and changes in senior personnel. However, the effect of the Rich List on 
the aforementioned entities varies in association with the institutional environment.  
According to the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis, stock prices reflect 
all public information. Investment decisions are sensitive to public information and 
expectation of public information. The institutional environments have dual effect on 
the stock market performance of affiliated companies. On one hand, investigations on 
unproductive activities are more efficient in provinces with better institutional 
environments. On the other hand, since entrepreneurial choices between productive 
and unproductive activities are catalyzed by institutional factors, companies with 
headquarters located in provinces with more favorable institutional environments 
offload less risk onto related companies, should an affiliated honoree be listed on the 
Rich List. In turn, cumulative abnormal returns due to the event would be positive to a 
greater magnitude due to the lowered risk, as the list demonstrates the capability of 
the honoree to some extent. 
 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression was used in this paper to identify 
fluctuations in stock prices of such listed companies due to the Forbes Rich List. An 
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Event Study was conducted to examine the correlation between the stock return of a 
company and the event in which its controller(s)4 is (are) placed on the Forbes Rich 
List. Data was sourced from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
Database (CSMAR). It is found that the event has a significant impact on the 
performance of the associated stocks. Moreover, the institutional environment of the 
province where a company’s headquarters are located is positively related to the said 
company’s abnormal returns, at one percent significance level. It is also found that in 
provinces with better institutional environments, a negative shift in socio-cultural 
factors in 2001-2002 generated negative influence on cumulative abnormal returns in 
the event period.  
This paper contributes to existing literature in several ways. Firstly, our 
findings support the theory that institutional environments influence an individual’s 
engagement in entrepreneurial activities (Shane, 2003; Kreft and Sobel, 2005; Hall 
and Sobel, 2008), as well as the individual’s choice between productive and 
unproductive types of activities (Sobel, 2008; Minniti, 2008; Ashby, 2015). To avoid 
endogeneity, for each related stock, we measure the institutional environment from 
1985 up till one year prior to its controller’s entrance to the Rich List. This 
measurement ensures the accuracy of the assessment of institutional environments as 
entrepreneurs could not predict, nor prepare for, the consequences of the Forbes 
listing.  
 
Secondly, this paper extends the study of the relationship from the dimensions 
of legislation (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994) and economic policy (Parente and Prescott, 
1999; Holmes and Schmitz, 2001), to include the social-cultural dimension, as it takes 
into account changes in public opinion towards tycoons on the list.  
 
                                                 
4 The listees either own the company or can significantly influence the operation of the company. For 
example, Lou Zhongfu and Liu Yonghao held just 17.87% and 7.98% of shares in Shanghai A-share 
stocks 600052 and 600016 from 2001 to 2002 respectively, but they were the largest shareholders and 
sat on the boards of directors, meaning that they could significantly influence the operation of the 
company.  
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Finally, this study enriches the literature by focusing on China. Previously, 
little research has been conducted on the nuances of entrepreneurial behavior in China 
in relation to institutional factors. Sobel (2008) used political entrepreneurship as a 
measure of unproductive entrepreneurial activities in the United States. Bjørnskov and 
Foss (2010), Bowen and Clercq (2008), and Amorós (2009) applied the economic 
freedom index as a proxy measure of institutional environments. This is the first paper 
to investigate the above-mentioned relationship in China using a provincial level 
measurement of institutional factors. Raw data generated by Xiao (2006) refers to the 
methodology used by the World Competitiveness Yearbook published by 
International Institute for Management Development annually.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information of our study. The empirical methodology is presented in Section 3, and 
the data description is presented in Section 4. Section 5 reports the estimation results 
and robust discussion results, and finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Background  
2.1 The Forbes Rich List in Mainland China  
In China, following the socialist transformation of private corporations, the 
development of private business has been suspended from 1956 to 1989. By 1999, 
only 10 years after the legalization of private enterprises, a number of entrepreneurs 
have accumulated substantial wealth. In the same year, Forbes magazine launched its 
first China Rich List.5 The newcomers of the list had an estimated asset value of USD 
6 million, equivalent to around USD 200 million on a purchasing power parity basis 
in the United States. At the time, China’s annual per capita income was only around 
                                                 
5 In 1999, Forbes purchased the list for mainland China from Rupert Hoogewerf, a British chartered 
accountant who compiled the list. Hoogewerf collected information from various sources including 
newspapers and magazines, corporate financial reports, China's Who's Who, securities firms, the 
Internet, donors to charities, awardees of national prizes, and delegates to the National People's 
Congress. Hoogewerf compared different published estimates of individual’s wealth and offered a 
conservative estimate for each person.  
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USD 700. Moreover, the ranking focused on individuals who actively work to 
increase their fortune, rather than “princelings”, whose fortunes are mostly inherited.  
In 2000, the survey methodology was refined. The survey compiled estimated 
the financial figures of enterprises that individual entrepreneurs preside over. The 
total estimated aggregated value of all assets of the top 50 richest on the list was USD 
10 billion, with the average net worth USD 203.8 million. In the following year, 50 
more newcomers joined the rank. Apart from that, Forbes extend the interpretation of 
the definition of “Chinese”, to include anyone who was born and raised in Greater 
China,6 and had conducted business in Mainland China. In 2002, there was no further 
adjustment in the forging of the list. 
2.2 Institutional Environment in Mainland China after 1978 
Reductions in government intervention in microeconomic activities and 
greater macroeconomic management and regulation facilitate the reforms regarding 
institutional environment in China (The World Bank, 1995). However, the 
macroeconomic and microeconomic policies have not made to work in a mutually 
reinforcing way. The non-synchronization between legislation and changes in 
microeconomic activity has shrouded entrepreneurial activities in a veil of great 
uncertainty.  
Prior to the constitutional revisions in March 1999, non-state sectors were 
largely ignored in formulation of economy policies. Compared to state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), private enterprises in China are more difficult to obtain political 
and financial supports from state government (Tsang, 1994; Chow and Fung, 1996). 
Such situation implies that private companies need to pay strong attention to the 
establishment of good relationships with local governments for smooth operation (Xin 
and Pearce, 1996; Peng and Luo, 2000; Park and Luo, 2001; Luo, 2003; Wu and 
Leung, 2005). Under such institutional environment, rent-seeking behavior was 
necessary in order to acquire critical resources and access entrepreneurial 
opportunities. Unproductive wealth accumulating activities thus became common for 
these future billionaires.  
                                                 
6 Greater China consists of mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.  
7 
 
 
  
8 
 
3. Methodology  
The Seemingly Unrelated Regression model below was applied to address the cross-
sectional dependence in residuals (Christie, 1990; Firth et. al., 2014), i.e., eliminating 
the impact of unobservable variables that make these companies to be influenced by 
the same event.  
  
  
……..  
 (1) 
 
where: 
 Rit is the daily stock return of a stock i in the event period; 
 rmt is the market index return in the event period; 
 μit is a dummy variable that equals one if the trading day is in the event 
window, and zero if in the estimation window; 
 Єit is the residual; 
 αit, βit and γit are the parameters; 
t refers to the number of trading days in the event period, and γits is expected to be 
zero if the announcement of the list has no effect.  
The following hypotheses were tested. 
Hypothesis 1: The parameters of the event dummy variable across the sample 
are not equal to zero.  
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Hypotheses 2 and 3 were proposed to identify whether the socio-cultural 
environment causes the event effect for the listed company’s controller(s).  
Hypothesis 2: For companies whose controllers entered the list for the first 
time, the estimated parameters of the event dummy variable across companies do not 
equal zero in all equations.  
Hypothesis 2 is the sub-hypothesis of Hypothesis 1. That is, Hypothesis 1 
holds if we do not have sufficient evidence to reject Hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 3: For companies whose controllers were dropped out of the list, 
the estimated parameters of the event dummy variable across the stocks do not equal 
zero in all equations in the year of dropping out of the list.  
Hypothesis 3 assumes that the effect of being falling out of the list is positive, 
ceteris paribus, if being on the list is negative.  
 
After identifying the existence of the event effect, we define the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) following the model proposed by Dombrow et al. (2000). 
Firstly, the abnormal return (AR) on each trading day in the event window is recorded. 
The observations are then aggregated across the event period to draw overall 
inferences for the event of interest. For stock i, we define the CARi as: 
 
(2) 
where 
  is the predicted daily stock return in the event window, and  
 t1 is the total trading days in the event window.  
 CARi of observations represents the influence of the event, which is different 
across companies due to their own individual characteristics.  
 
Referring to the model developed by Fama and French (1992), we use a 
pooled cross-sectional OLS to examine the association between the magnitude of the 
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CAR and the characteristics specific to event observations. The following model was 
estimated: 
 
 (3) 
 
where 
 Xi is the variable vector measuring the company’s characteristics of stocks;  
 Insi is the variable vector representing institutional environments;  
 α0 is the intercept term; 
 β is the vector of coefficients for company characteristics, including earning 
power (ROA), viability (the length of company history before IPO), corporate 
governance (the percentage of shares owned by the controller(s), and the 
dummy variable of whether SOEs hold stock shares in a company), relative 
competitiveness in the industry (the market share of the company in the 
industry), and the education level of the controller(s). 
 η is the coefficient vector of the measurements of the institutional 
environment;  
 εi is the error term.  
 
Following the belief that provinces with better institutional environments offer 
entrepreneurs incentives to choose productive activities over unproductive activities, 
while more competitive government can carry out scrutiny more efficiently and 
influence the expectation about the firm, the following hypotheses were also tested: 
Hypothesis 4: The government competitiveness index has a positive 
relationship with the CAR.  
The competitiveness index of government administration for each province, 
obtained from the China Regional Competitiveness Development Report (Xiao, 2006), 
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is applied as a proxy for the institutional environment. The report provides data from 
1985 to 2005. The index evaluates government administration from four aspects: 
government expenditure, fiscal policy, government efficiency, and social equality and 
safety. If companies choose more productive activities, when investigations are 
carried out, they are more likely able to prove their innocence. Being honorees of 
Rich List just illustrates that their controllers are the most capable entrepreneurs in 
mainland China.  
Hypothesis 5: Interaction term of the government competitiveness index and 
time dummy has a negative relationship with the CAR. 
Interaction terms measure effects of government competitiveness on CAR 
when socio-cultural environment changed. After 1999, the public has noticed that 
successful convictions usually followed investigations on illegal activities with regard 
to the companies presided by the honorees. And, investigation started by a more 
competitive government is more efficient. Therefore, investigation may deteriorate 
investors’ confidence no matter whether the honorees are convicted later on or not, 
especially in provinces with better institutional environment.    
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4. Data 
The sample period cover from 1999 to 2002, a period in which only Forbes 
published rich list of billionaires in mainland China annually. The effects of being on 
Forbes China Rich List is difficult to identify after 2002 for the launch of various 
similar lists of China’s richest people by other institutions, such as Bloomberg L.P.. 
The financial figures were obtained from CSMAR, which also provides some data of 
personal characteristics of entrepreneurs. The variable data that measures institutional 
environment are sourced from China Regional Competitiveness Development Report 
(Xiao, 2006). The number of listed companies controlled by listees in 1999, 2000, 
2001, and 2002 were 9, 12, 33, and 32, respectively.   
 
The daily return data of a firm and its market index are drawn from the 
CSMAR stock files from 1998 to 2003. The data covers stocks in all four stock 
markets in mainland China: Shanghai A-share market, Shanghai B-share market, 
Shenzhen A-share market, and Shenzhen B-share market. The estimation window 
spans from 200 days to 31 days before the event date, and the event window consists 
of 30 trading days before and after the event date. For each year in the sample period, 
we have at most 201 observations for every stock and the relevant market index, 
except stocks that are newly listed or were suspended during the estimation window 
period.  
 
In Table 2-1, a summary of the variables used in CAR analysis is presented.   
 
Insert Table 2-1 Here 
 
The cross-sectional analysis includes explanatory variables for firm 
characteristics, industries and institutional environments. The dependent variable, the 
CAR, varies from -50.02 percent to 51.08 percent with a mean of -1.09 percent. The 
change in socio-cultural environments is measured by the dummy year variables for 
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the years 1999 to 2002. The effect of investor perception is represented by the 
estimated coefficients of the dummy variables using observations in 1999 as the base.  
 
The implication of the length of the period between a company’s establishment 
and its listing as well as the ownership percentage of its listed shares are taken into 
consideration in the dummy variable. Table 2-1 shows that companies in this study 
were founded up to eight years before their IPO with the average being 2.08 years; 
stock shares of 23 companies in the sample were held by SOEs, and the mean 
proportion of stock shares held by listees is 40.34 percent, with the minimum and 
maximum being 7.89 percent and 71.25 percent respectively. 
 
Compiling data from the China’s Listed Firms Corporate Governance 
Research Database, the China Stock Market Financial Database, and the CSMAR 
annual report, we calculate the return on total asset ratio (ROA7) to measure the 
earning power of a company. As shown in Table 2-1, the mean ROA in the sample is 
5.61 percent, with 21.04 percent being the maximum and -13.35 percent being the 
minimum.  
 
The factor, educational attainment of the honorees is controlled for 
comparative purpose. Educational background is rated on a scale from one to six:  one 
indicates primary school and six indicates university degree or above. In total, 76.74 
percent of individuals in the sample received education above junior college level and 
30.23 percent above undergraduate level.  
 
According to the Guidance for Industry Classification of Listed Companies of 
China, a firm’s industry share in the sample is calculated as the percentage of total 
market value of the whole industry that a firm constituted on the event date. The mean 
industry share of a company in the three years prior to the publication of the Rich List 
                                                 
7 Since different companies have their own capital structures, sometimes depending on the industry 
characteristics, we apply the ROA as a consistent measure of profitability across all companies. 
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is the average of the industry shares recorded 365, 710, and 1,095 calendar days 
before the event date, respectively. The minimum value of this variable is zero, 
indicating that the company was listed in the year the list was launched. As shown in 
Table 2-1, the mean of this variable is 4.65 percent.8  
 
The average GDP growth rates from 1989 to one year prior to honorees being 
in the Forbes list, 9 (the subject is missing) was used to measure the economic 
performance of the province in which a company’s general headquarters are located. 
This aims to measure economic trends consistently. The average GDP growth rate is 
12.16 percent, while the minimum and the maximum are 7.85 percent and 16.58 
percent respectively.  
 
In China, the political climate of a province may influence entrepreneurial 
choices between productive and unproductive activities. For example, before 2001, 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) enforced quota system on the 
total number of listed companies and granted the quota to each province annually 
according to its economic situation.  As a result, mainland enterprises with an 
intention to get listed in China stress great importance on establishment of good 
relationship with local governments. Hence, the mean competitiveness index of 
provincial government administrations from 1989 to one year before honoree 
appearing in the Rich List was used to represent the long-run political climate faced 
by companies. The mean is 63.88 and the standard deviation is 18.84.  
 
Table 2-2 presents data of the locations and density of general headquarters 
across 17 provinces.  
 
Insert Table 2-2 Here  
                                                 
8 We also find that, as Stock 600256 was the only publicly listed company in the non-metal mineral 
product industry, its industry share was 100 percent in our sample. 
9 CHINA COMPENDIUM OF STATISTICS 1949-2004 (2005), Beijing, China: National Bureau of 
Statistics of China. 
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5. Estimation Results and Discussion 
Result 
The results of the tests for hypotheses one to three are summarized in Table 3. 
Hypothesis 1 was not rejected, while Hypotheses 2 and 3 were rejected.  
 
 
Insert Table 3 Here 
 
 
F-test and ݔଶ -test for hypothesis 1 show that the probability that the 
parameters of the event dummy variable all equate to zero is 0.0005. This reveals that 
the event of list publication does reveal more information to the stock market by 
identifying the names of successful entrepreneurs in China, allowing billionaires to 
concretely compare their wealth with others. The result is consistent with the findings 
of Firth et. al. (2014), in which they find that stocks of 113 listed companies presided 
by Hurun Rich honorees plunged following the publication of the rankings. The 
rejections of hypotheses 2 and 3 depicts that the public attitude towards honorees are 
not unanimous across three years.  
 
To examine hypotheses 4 and 5, we conduct a cross-sectional analysis to 
further analyze and explain the influence of the institutional environment on CAR and 
effects of the event on relevant company stocks. Table 4 reports the pooled cross-
sectional OLS estimation results of CAR.  
 
Insert Table 4 Here 
 
 
Hypothesis 4 holds as our results imply. This shows that institutional 
environment in the political dimension is found to have a strong positive relationship 
with the event effect. Note from Table 4 that the estimated parameter is significant at 
the 1 percent significance level after controlling for factors of economic environment, 
socio-cultural environment, and interaction terms. It is expected that a one-unit 
increase in the government competitiveness index result in 1.2971 percent increase in 
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CAR according to the regression results. The result is consistent with the expectation 
that a better political environment encourages proportionately more productive 
activities and reduces proportion of unproductive entrepreneurial opportunities, such 
as rent-seeking or smuggling.  
 
Our result reveals that there is not sufficient evidence to reject Hypothesis 5. 
Estimated coefficients of all three interaction terms are negative. From 2001 to 2002, 
the significance level increased from 10 percent to 1 percent. It can be inferred that as 
more and more listees are under investigation for suspected offence as time passes by, 
relevant government department and agencies might pay extra attention to the 
operations of the affiliated firms. Listees may feel powerless regarding their political 
destiny because of the uncertain political climate and inconsistent enforcement of 
laws.  
 
The empirical results show that the impact of average provincial GDP growth 
is positive but insignificant, suggesting that aggregate stock market performance may 
be highly correlated with inflation and fortune growth (Flannery and Protopapadakis, 
2002) rather than GDP growth.  
 
Finally, the year dummies are included in the model to investigate the effects 
of public perception. Significant negative influence from being on the Forbes list was 
observed, taking 1999 as the reference group, in regression (4) in table 4. The public 
belief changed over the sample period. After adding the interaction term in regression 
(5) in table 4, the difference becomes insignificantly positive in 2000 and 2001, while 
that of the CAR figure is positive and significant at 10 percent significance level, in 
2002. These results indicate that the relatively lower CAR in the 2000-2002 period 
results from more strict scrutiny in provinces with more competitive government. 
 
To further discuss the annual differences, the daily cumulative average 
abnormal return (CAAR) of each year was calculated to further illustrate changes in 
public opinion towards listees over the four-year period.           
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ܥܣܣܴ௜,௧మ ൌ ∑ ܣܣܴ௜௧భ,௧మ ൌ ∑ ଵேೞ ∑ ܣܴ௜௧భ,௧మ
௜ୀேೞ௜ୀଵ
௧భୀ்௧భୀଵ
௧భୀ்௧భୀଵ                            (4) 
 
ܣܣܴ௜௧భ,௧మ	is the average abnormal return of all observations in a year in each 
trading day of the event window. T is the length of the event window, t2 is years 1999, 
2000, 2001 and 2002, and Ns is the number of stocks in each year.   
 
Figure 1 shows the results. Contrary to the findings of Firth et al. (2014), our 
result shows that strictly positive daily CAAR values of up to 18.87 percent were 
recorded at the end of the event window in 1999. In 2000, some of the daily CAAR 
values were negative. The negative sign of the daily CAAR figures in all trading days 
within the event window implies that public perception differed from that of 1999.  
 
 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
 
 
In each regression model, the following company-specific characteristics were 
also controlled for. The estimated coefficient of the ROA is positive but does not play 
a significant role in the CAR of each company after the addition of dummy year 
variable. Similar results can be found in the parameter estimation of the average 
industry share in the previous three years. It is found that company history has a 
positive and significant influence at one percent level on the CAR. A billionaire’s 
education level does not have a significant relationship with the CAR. The dummy 
variable indicates that the share owned by SOE has a negative impact on the stock 
return of a company. From Table 4, if SOE has shares of a listed company presided 
by the honorees, the CAR of the company drops by 12.09 percent in the event 
window, as exhibited in regression (5). This result is consistent with that of Tian 
(2001), who found that when shares of a company owned by government increased, 
corporate performance of the company declined until government took over it.  
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Another corporate governance variable, the percentage of stock shares held by 
Forbes listees, shows both an individual’s management ability and the relative risk of 
being on the list. The results show that after controlling the influence of institutional 
environment, the parameter’s estimation is negative and significant at the 5 percent 
significance level as shown in column (5) of Table 4. The variable reflects the risk 
expected by investors, given that the higher proportion of company shares a 
billionaire owns, the higher the risk an investor faces if the billionaire is found guilty 
of a criminal offense.  
 
Discussion 
After carrying out two types of examination, our result remains to be robust. 
In one examination, four more possible factors that can influence the effect of 
institutional environment are investigated. Table 5 reports results. In the other, we 
generate government competitiveness index covering different time periods and 
replicate regression (5) in table 4. Results are showed in table 6. 
Table 2-1 also describes four factors. Government relationship, i.e., whether 
there is local government among the top ten shareholders. From CSMAR, we identify 
that 8 observations have such relationship. Liu et. al. (2013) finds that political capital 
can facilitate the firms to go publicly listed in China, and political capital can create 
value for publicly listed companies (Faccio et. al., 2006). If the observation has such 
relationship, the company is expected to be protected in the event. The next factor is 
the total loan to GDP ratio. 10  It is used to measure the financial development of the 
province from 1985 to one year before honorees appearing in the Rich List. The mean 
is 94.29 percent. In the province where firms have more access to fund, they are 
expected to conduct less unproductive activities. The third factor is the number of 
times that honoree appears in Forbes Rich List. On average, honorees make the cut 
2.51 times. More times an honoree appears in the Rich List, the better reputation s/he 
has. The last one is whether honoree enhanced education attainment or not in the 
                                                 
10 GDP data and Loan data come from CHINA COMPENDIUM OF STATISTICS 1949-2009 (2011), 
Beijing, China: National Bureau of Statistics of China.  
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sample period. Forbes Lists from 1999 to 2002 reveal that 8 observations in our 
sample improve their education attainment. It is expected that better education 
attainment can help honorees’ business operation. 
In table 5, the estimated coefficients of government competitiveness index 
remains significant level of one percent and changes only a few percent. To facilitate 
presentation, regression (1) in table 5 is exactly regression (5) in table 4. All four 
factors have no significant influence on CAR, and adjusted R-square decreases when 
these four factors are included in regression. All four methods cannot protect the 
listed firms in the event.  
In table 6, the calculation of government competitiveness extend to the year 
that honorees appear in the Rich List. In regression (1), the variable is the mean from 
the year that the company is established. The next is from 1985, and the final two 
methods are from 1990 and 1995 respectively. Comparing with original method, the 
significance level decreases from one percent to five percent in all four regressions. 
The estimated coefficients remains being positive, while the magnitude decreases to 
0.7085 in regression (4). Since the government competitiveness indexes among 
provinces converge as time passing by, excluding earlier years and including the 
current year dampen the variability of the factor and reduce the explanation power. 
However, the influence of institutional environment in political dimension is robust 
and significant across various calculation methods.     
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the institutional environment 
and the tendency of engaging in unproductive entrepreneurial activities in China. The 
launch of the Forbes China Rich List had generated an exogenous shock to stock 
market, and changed the socio-cultural environment in China. The entrepreneurs on 
the list faced investigations for the past unproductive activities of their companies. An 
event study was conducted to analyze the associated changes a public company 
underwent when its controller was on the Forbes Rich list. The results show that the 
institutional environment directly influenced the nature of entrepreneurial activities 
carried out. 
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For the future research, the role of performance consistency in entrepreneurial 
decision-making could be examined (Gompers et al., 2010), investigating whether a 
successful entrepreneur’s greater possibility to succeed in new ventures would 
influence his business choices. Finally, a behavioral economic experiment, similar to 
that of Weitzel et al. (2010), could be conducted to investigate the behavioral 
characteristics of listees and their selections between productive and unproductive 
entrepreneurial activities. 
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Table 1: The Rich on the list from 1999 to 2002 and being in trouble  
or found guilty 
 
Name In list year Trouble and crime sentence 
Huang Hongsheng 1999–2002 Limited imprisonment of 6 years 
Li Jingwei 1999 Being suspected of corruption and bribery 
Liu Xiaoqing 1999 Being suspected of crime against tax collection 
Lu Junxiong 1999 Limited imprisonment of 18 years 
Lv Youzhen  1999 Limited imprisonment of 7 years 
Mou Qizhong 1999 Life imprisonment 
Rubia Kadell 1999 Limited imprisonment of 8 years 
Sun Feng 1999 Limited imprisonment of 6 and a half years 
Wu Zhijian 1999–2000 Limited imprisonment of 17 years 
Gu Chujun 2001 Forbidden to enter stock market for a lifetime 
Shi Minzhi 2001 Being suspected of raping two underage girls 
Tang Wanxin 2001–2002 Limited imprisonment of 8 years 
Yang Bin 2001 Limited imprisonment of 18 years 
Yang Rong 2001 Exiled abroad for being suspected of embezzling state assets 
Zhou Zhengyi 2001–2002 Limited imprisonment of 3 years 
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Table 2-1: Summary of pooled cross-sectional analysis variables 
 
Variable Obs. 
Num. 
Mean Std. Min. Max 
Cumulative abnormal return (%) 86 -1.0938 16.9382 -50.0167 51.0795 
The length of the company’s history before its IPO 86 2.0814 2.2918 0.0000 8.0000 
SOE holds stock share in company 86 0.2326 0.4249 0.0000 1.0000 
Return on total asset ratio (%) 86 5.6109 4.5515 -13.3466 21.0442 
Controller’s stock share (%) 86 40.3358 14.3226 7.9800 71.2500 
Education level 86 4.8256 1.2385 2.0000 6.0000 
Mean previous industry share (%) 86 4.6528 11.3706 0.0000 100.0000 
Average provincial GDP growth ratio (%) 86 12.1620 2.1656 7.8545 16.5818 
Gov. competitiveness index 86 63.8827 18.8438 37.7180 91.2567 
Government relationship 86 0.0930 0.2922 0.0000 1.0000 
Provincial loan/GDP (%) 86 94.2913 19.6389 47.1125 121.2790 
Num. of times being honoree 86 2.5116 1.0599 1.0000 4.0000 
Education level enhanced 86 0.0930 0.2922 0.0000 1.0000 
 
 
Table 2-2: Provinces where general headquarters are located 
 
General 
Headquarters Freq. Percent Cum. 
Beijing 2 2.33 2.33 
Chongqing 1 1.16 3.49 
Fujian 3 3.49 6.98 
Guangdong 10 11.63 18.6 
Heilongjiang 4 4.65 23.26 
Henan 2 2.33 25.58 
Hubei 1 1.16 26.74 
Hunan 1 1.16 27.91 
Jiangsu 4 4.65 32.56 
Jilin 2 2.33 34.88 
Liaoling 1 1.16 36.05 
Shandong 4 4.65 40.7 
Shanghai 24 27.91 68.6 
Shan’xi 8 9.3 77.91 
Sichuan 9 10.47 88.37 
Xinjiang 3 3.49 91.86 
Zhejiang 7 8.14 100 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Hypothesis test results  
 
 Being on the List Newly on the List Being out of the List 
F test F( 87, 10701) =    1.58 F( 46,  6026) =    1.08 F( 13,  2561) =    0.29 
Prob. >F 0.0005 0.3370 0.9930 
χ2 test chi2( 87) =  137.36 chi2( 46) =   49.48 chi2( 13) =    3.81 
Prob. >Chi2 0.0005 0.3362 0.9930 
 
 
Figure 1: Cumulative average abnormal return from 1999 to 2002 
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Table 4: Pooled cross-sectional OLS estimations of cumulative abnormal return 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Company history length before IPO 1.4552* 1.6127** 1.7698** 1.9245*** 1.9750*** 
 1.88 2.08 2.52 2.72 2.87 
SOE holds stock share in company -14.7994*** -16.6472*** -11.2049*** -13.1954*** -12.0946*** 
 3.46 3.7 2.78 3.1 2.85 
Return on total asset ratio 0.7435* 0.8141* 0.2279 0.2852 0.2132 
 1.75 1.92 0.55 0.68 0.53 
Controller’ stock share   -0.2721* -0.3053** -0.2604** -0.3205** -0.3270** 
 1.95 2.15 2.05 2.47 2.59 
Education level 1.2043 1.2645 1.8256 2.261 1.573 
 0.78 0.85 1.33 1.62 1.14 
Mean previous industry share 0.1576 0.1805 0.1561 0.2043 0.1724 
 1.02 1.17 1.11 1.44 1.24 
Average provincial GDP growth ratio 0.3213   0.5568 0.3884 
 0.39   0.68 0.49 
Gov. competitiveness index  0.1196  0.1492 1.2971*** 
  1.21  1.61 2.76 
Year dummy for 2000   -14.1266** -12.4416* 49.5771 
   2.17 1.91 1.53 
Year dummy for 2001   -24.3914*** -25.0080*** 42.1632 
   4.25 4.39 1.41 
Year dummy for 2002   -22.3693*** -23.4447*** 55.9417* 
   3.73 3.87 1.86 
Gov. index* year 2000 dummy     -1.0244* 
     1.93 
Gov. index* year 2001 dummy     -1.1207** 
     2.31 
Gov. index* year 2002 dummy     -1.3073*** 
     2.68 
Constant -4.3292 -7.4148 17.1701* 1.1865 -61.9595** 
 0.30 0.68 1.87 0.08 2.12 
Observations 86 86 86 86 86 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1269 0.1412 0.2845 0.2995 0.3414 
Absolute values of t-statistics under estimated coefficients; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 5: Pooled cross-sectional OLS estimations of cumulative abnormal return 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Company history length before IPO 1.9750*** 1.9887*** 1.9584*** 1.9325*** 1.9941*** 
 2.87 2.87 2.83 2.74 2.87 
SOE holds stock share in company -12.0946*** -10.8235** -11.9577*** -12.4112*** -12.3812*** 
 2.85 2.08 2.79 2.82 2.83 
Return on total asset ratio 0.2132 0.1311 0.2164 0.2198 0.222 
 0.53 0.29 0.53 0.54 0.54 
Controller’ stock share   -0.3270** -0.3344** -0.3233** -0.3251** -0.3279** 
 2.59 2.61 2.54 2.55 2.58 
Education level 1.573 1.6019 1.8481 1.5451 1.6421 
 1.14 1.15 1.23 1.11 1.17 
Mean previous industry share 0.1724 0.1676 0.1797 0.1697 0.1752 
 1.24 1.19 1.28 1.21 1.25 
Average provincial GDP growth ratio 0.3884 0.4334 0.0311 0.3369 0.3983 
 0.49 0.54 0.03 0.41 0.50 
Gov. competitiveness index 1.2971*** 1.2984*** 1.3328*** 1.3057*** 1.2934*** 
 2.76 2.74 2.78 2.75 2.73 
Year dummy for 2000 49.5771 48.6106 49.003 50.2938 50.0709 
 1.53 1.49 1.51 1.54 1.54 
Year dummy for 2001 42.1632 41.0842 41.589 42.7092 42.0782 
 1.41 1.36 1.38 1.42 1.4 
Year dummy for 2002 55.9417* 54.8771* 54.8827* 56.8819* 55.4819* 
 1.86 1.80 1.81 1.87 1.83 
Gov. index* year 2000 dummy -1.0244* -1.0102* -1.0240* -1.0307*	 -1.0282* 
 1.93 1.89 1.92 1.93	 1.92 
Gov. index* year 2001 dummy -1.1207** -1.1092** -1.1131** -1.1314**	 -1.1158** 
 2.31 2.27 2.28 2.32	 2.29 
Gov. index* year 2002 dummy -1.3073*** -1.2977** -1.2903** -1.3222***	 -1.2975** 
 2.68 2.64 2.63 2.68	 2.64 
Government relationship  -3.3549    
  0.43    
Provincial loan/GDP (%)   -0.0681   
   0.46   
Num. of times being honoree    -0.5138	  
    0.30	  
Education level enhanced     -1.6543 
     0.30 
Constant -61.9595** -61.6508** -54.9132 -60.3714** -62.2255** 
 2.12 2.10 1.66 2.02 2.12 
Observations 86 86 86 86 86 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3414 0.3338 0.3341 0.3329 0.3329 
Absolute values of t-statistics under estimated coefficients; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 6: Pooled cross-sectional OLS estimations for government competitiveness 
index with various calculation method  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method for the calculation of long-run 
government competitiveness index: 
The year 
company 
established to the 
year in list 
1985 to the year 
in list 
1990 to the year 
in list 
1995 to the year 
in list 
 Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Other variables controlled     
     
Gov. competitiveness index 0.8322** 1.0913** 0.9006** 0.7085** 
 2.33 2.45 2.35 2.04 
Year dummy for 2000 27.2469 41.3827 32.9374 22.4195 
 0.99 1.29 1.14 0.81 
Year dummy for 2001 20.3315 33.5878 24.1081 14.6662 
 0.81 1.13 0.91 0.58 
Year dummy for 2002 33.5255 47.5397 36.8329 26.3994 
 1.3 1.57 1.37 1.02 
Gov. index* year 2000 dummy -0.5923 -0.8395 -0.6959 -0.509 
 1.42 1.66 1.57 1.24 
Gov. index* year 2001 dummy -0.6847* -0.9171** -0.7535* -0.5787 
 1.85 2 1.9 1.61 
Gov. index* year 2002 dummy -0.8528** -1.0987** -0.9156** -0.7230* 
 2.27 2.38 2.28 1.97 
Constant -34.7398 -48.3856* -38.7288 -27.9512 
 1.49 1.78 1.59 1.23 
Observations 86 86 86 86 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3184 0.3252 0.3172 0.3022 
Absolute values of t-statistics under estimated coefficients; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
